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This paper assesses the effectiveness of monetary policy communication of the Central Bank of 
Turkey (CBT) by quantifying the information content of the policy statements released right after 
the monthly Monetary Policy Committee meetings.  First, we quantify the signal regarding the 
next interest rate decision and ask whether CBT’s words match its deeds, i.e., whether 
communication improves predictability using the Autoregressive Conditional Hazard model. Our 
findings suggest that the role of statements in predicting the next policy move have strengthened 
following the adoption of full-fledged inflation targeting (IT) regime. Second, we identify the 
surprise component of policy communication directly from market commentaries and assess its 
impact on the term structure of interest rates.  We find that the response of the yield curve to 
policy statements have become highly significant for the unanticipated changes in the monetary 
policy communication and the relative importance of communication in driving market yields has 
increased through time.   
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1.  Introduction   
Since the early 1990s, the conduct of monetary policy has shifted from secrecy 
towards more transparency.  The main reason behind this global trend was the increasing 
understanding that transparency can improve the effectiveness of policy (see Woodford, 
2003).  This approach has highlighted the role of communication in monetary policy.  
Accordingly, the academic literature explored this topic extensively over the last fifteen 
years (see e.g. Blinder et al., 2008, Ehrmann and Fratzcher, 2007a-d, Reeves and 
Sawicki, 2007, Rozkurt et al., 2007, Fatum and Scholnick, 2008, Beine et al., 2009, 
Chulia et al., 2010, Sturm and de Haan, 2011, among others).   
Central banks often use short-term interest rates as their main operational 
instrument.  However, short-term rates hardly matter for the broader objectives of the 
central banks such as future inflation or prospective economic activity, as private 
consumption and investment decisions are mainly driven by longer term interest rates.  
Communication emerges as a natural bridge in this respect, which enables central banks 
to steer private sector expectations about their future actions and affect the longer end of 
the yield curve.   
Monetary policy communication typically takes two main forms.  The first one is 
communication through official documents such as inflation reports and policy 
announcements that accompany interest rate decisions.  The second form of 
communication involves speeches, presentations or interviews by the policymakers 
during the inter-meeting period.  In this paper, we focus on central bank communication 
through policy statements accompanying the interest rate decisions.   2 
 
Two types of information are released in a policy statement.  The first piece of 
information is the interest rate decision itself.  In a seminal paper on this topic, Kuttner 
(2001) highlighted that following the interest rate announcements, market participants 
only respond to the unanticipated component of the interest rate decision.  The second 
piece of information released with announcements, which is the main scope of this paper, 
is the forward looking message—the communication component.  There have been 
numerous studies focusing on the monetary policy communication and its impact on 
financial markets.  Just like the decision itself, policy communication should have an 
impact on financial markets only if it has some surprise content.  Yet, the literature has 
not always been very careful in underlining the unanticipated component of policy 
communication due to the challenging nature of this task.  The earlier studies that 
investigated the effects of policy statements attempted to use the information content of 
policy statements directly to assess the impact of communication on financial markets.  
However, these papers did not propose a systematic identification procedure to measure 
the surprise in policy communication, and thus, they were mostly silent on the 
methodology on the signal extraction process.  For example, although Guthrie and Wright 
(2000) investigate the impact of communication surprises on financial indicators, the 
authors do not explain in detail how they actually compute the surprises.  Kohn and Sack 
(2004) get around the difficulties of quantifying communication by focusing on the 
impact of policy statements on the volatility of financial assets, implicitly assuming that 
at least some part of the policy statement carries an unanticipated component to affect 
financial markets.   3 
 
In order to measure the surprise content of the communication, more recent 
studies estimate the unanticipated component of communication using econometric 
techniques (see e.g.  Gurkaynak et al., 2005, Andersson et al., 2006, Rosa and Verga, 
2007, Rosa and Verga, 2008, Rosa, 2011).  Nevertheless, these techniques assume a 
particular law of motion for the formation of expectations and they provide an indirect 
measure of policy surprises. 
One possible explanation for the scarcity of papers that study the impact of the 
unanticipated component of policy statements is the inherent challenge in measuring the 
surprise due to lack of expectations surveys on the “wording” of the statements.  Indeed, 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) state that “Ideally one would want to study the response 
of financial markets to the surprise component contained in a given communication.  
However construction of a proxy of market expectations is not straightforward, for 
instance no survey data like in the case of macroeconomic announcements or monetary 
policy decisions are available.” 
There are no surveys but there are market commentaries.  This paper contributes 
to the ever growing literature on central bank communication by using a novel and simple 
methodology to measure the unanticipated component of policy statements: we identify 
the statement surprises directly from market commentaries published before and after the 
release of monthly Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) statements of the Central Bank of 
Turkey (CBT).
3 In most cases market players not only explicitly mention whether the 
                                                 
3 Clearly, monthly statements are not the only communication tools. There are other forms of 
communication tools available such as speeches/interviews by the governor or the members of the 
monetary policy committee. However, in the case of CBT, inflation reports and monthly policy statements 
are by far the most actively used communication tools of monetary policy (see the CBT’s main policy 4 
 
statement was expected but also implicitly indicate in which direction they were 
surprised.  Therefore, comparing the comments written by central bank watchers before 
and after the meeting allows us to pin down the surprise component of the 
communication. 
Using the surprise components derived from market commentaries, we measure 
the impact of central bank communication over the yield curve.  We assess whether 
monetary policy communication affects expectations of future interest rates in the desired 
direction via its reflections on the yield curve.  We find that policy statements play a 
significant role in affecting the yield curve, independent of the current interest rate 
decision.  In particular, the yield curve on average shifts by an additional 20 basis points 
over the medium term following a surprise change in the policy stance.   
The second contribution of the paper is an evaluation of the potential 
effectiveness of the systematic component of monetary policy communication in Turkey.  
We quantify the CBT’s implied signal regarding the next interest rate decision and assess 
whether central bank communication has actually improved the predictability of the 
interest rate decisions after the adoption of a more clear and transparent policy 
framework with the inflation targeting regime.  For each document, we track the changes 
                                                                                                                                                 
strategy document at http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/announce/2010/Mon_Exc_Pol_2011.php).  In this paper, 
we restrict our attention only to the monthly policy statements rather than the Inflation Report because of 
the lack of sufficient data for market commentaries regarding the inflation report. In the early years of the 
inflation targeting period, market participants hardly commented on the inflation reports before and after 
the release.  Because our identification of communication surprises depends on these commentaries, we 
excluded inflation reports from our analysis, even though these reports are one of the main communication 
tools of CBT together with monthly monetary policy committee statements.   5 
 
in the wording on future policy rate so as to capture the signal regarding the next interest 
rate decision.  Utilizing these signals via a forecasting model developed for irregularly 
spaced events, we estimate whether the CBT’s words match its deeds.  The results 
suggest that central bank communication provided very accurate signals regarding the 
next interest rate decision in Turkey.  Especially after the implementation of the inflation-
targeting regime, the information content of policy statements improved the predictability 
of the CBT substantially, suggesting that the systematic component of central bank 
communication has also become potentially more effective.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The next section provides a 
brief evaluation of the history of central bank communication in Turkey.  Section three 
discusses our identification strategy while section four presents our empirical results.  
The fifth section concludes.   
 
2.  A Brief History of Monetary Policy Communication in Turkey 
Monetary policy of the Central Bank of Turkey became increasingly more 
transparent since 2001 with many important structural changes transforming the policy-
making environment.  In this section, we provide a brief history of the key developments 
affecting the policy-making process of the CBT and the relevant communication strategy 
during this period.
4 
                                                 
4 We restrict our attention to the period 2002-2010, when the CBT had a single objective of price stability 
and used short term interest rate as the unique policy instrument.  Therefore, we exclude the recent period 
(starting with the last quarter of 2010) when the CBT adopted financial stability as a supplementary 
objective and began to utilize additional policy instruments such as reserve requirement ratios.  Assessing 
the communication issues related to this episode is beyond the scope of this paper.   6 
 
In order to highlight the milestones affecting the communication strategy of 
monetary policy, we divide our sample into three parts: (i) 2001-2004: implicit inflation 
targeting with unknown decision dates, (ii) 2005: implicit inflation targeting with fixed 
decision dates but no explicit signal regarding future policy path, (iii) 2006-to-date: full-
fledged inflation targeting: explicit information regarding future policy path through 
policy announcements and inflation reports.   
 
2.1.  2001-2004: Implicit Inflation Targeting with Unknown Decision Dates
5 
Turkey adopted inflation targeting and free float exchange rate regime in 
February 2001.  The new Central Bank Law was enacted in May 2001, which defined the 
main goal of the CBT as “achieving price stability”.  Along with the legislation of the 
new law, CBT was granted with instrument independence and the short term interest rates 
became the main operational instrument of monetary policy.  The Law also defined a new 
decision making body—the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC).  The main task of the 
MPC is to formulate the monetary policy strategy, which includes setting the policy rates 
and communicating future monetary policy.   
At the initial stages of the new regime, monetary policy lacked control over the 
longer end of the yield curve, because under high public debt and short maturities, the 
volatile risk premium manifested itself as excess variability in the exchange rates.  
                                                 
5 Implicit inflation targeting can be defined as a period under which inflation targets are announced to the 
public, but not the regime and its details as such. It involves the country acting as if inflation targeting were 
in place without a formal adoption of the regime. Typically, the central bank would also have other 
intermediate targets, as Turkey did between 2002-2005 in the form of monetary targets. 
 7 
 
Increased volatility in exchange rates coupled with fast and high exchange rate pass-
through—inherited from the exchange rate targeting regimes—made forecasting inflation 
even more difficult, limiting the forecast horizon to a mere couple of months.  Therefore, 
CBT was not able to provide a medium term perspective regarding future inflation or 
monetary policy.  Under these circumstances, statements following the interest rate 
decisions were mainly focused on justifying the actions rather than providing explicit 
information regarding the future course of policy rates.
6 In other words, the forward-
looking component of the communication, which is the main interest of this study, was 
limited.   
Following the examples of the major central banks across the world, CBT started 
announcing interest rate decisions with an accompanying statement, although these 
statements at the beginning did not involve information regarding the future course of 
policy rates.  Monetary policy statements during 2002-2004 mainly focused on the 
implementation of the structural reforms—especially regarding fiscal policy, which 
would support the decline in risk premiums.  The main driver of inflation expectations 
during this period was fiscal policy (see Celasun et al.  2004).  Therefore, the strategy of 
the CBT during this period was to “reward” the government with policy rate cuts, should 
the structural reform and fiscal consolidation make progress.  Since sovereign risk 
premium largely reflected the market’s perceptions of the fiscal stance, the CBT closely 
monitored the risk premiums in setting the policy rates.   
                                                 
6 See Kara (2008) for an account of the CBT’s communication and decision-making process during 
implementation of the implicit inflation targeting regime.   8 
 
Overall, in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis, monetary policy in the first three years 
of implicit inflation targeting (the period between 2002 and 2004) can be characterized as 
a highly discretionary and rather opaque decision-making process: Since the economy 
was under a stabilization program with many structural changes, the statements mainly 
concentrated on structural reforms, fiscal policy, and hence the risk premiums, rather than 
broad economic analysis regarding the business cycle.  Timing of the policy decisions 
was not predictable, and the statements focused on justifying the decision itself, without 
providing systematic information on the future course of monetary policy.  The basic 
information provided in these statements was that the continuation of the interest rate cuts 
would depend on the implementation of structural reforms.  While the meeting calendar 
was not known in advance, policy decisions were announced with an accompanying 
statement at 10:00 AM in the morning.   
 
2.2.  2005: Adopting Fixed Decision Dates  
The CBT envisioned implicit inflation targeting as a transition period for full-
fledged inflation targeting, during which the communication, transparency, and the 
institutional setup would be enhanced gradually.  The decision-making process shifted to 
a more predictable and systematic setup in 2005 with the adoption of pre-announced 
fixed decision dates.  The MPC meetings, which were held on the 8
th of each month, were 
followed by a prompt release of a policy statement outlining the rationale behind the 
decisions, as well as providing the (consensus) opinion of the MPC.  The statement 
underlying the decisions was made public at 9:00 AM on the day after the meeting.  
These statements not only justified the immediate decisions but also provided signals 9 
 
regarding the future course of interest rates.  Although the signal content of the 
statements was weak at the beginning, it gained strength through time.  As time went by, 
more and more information was shared with the public, and the ability of CBT to act as 
an “expectations manager” improved considerably.   
 
2.3.  2006-to-date: Monetary Policy Communication under Inflation Targeting  
The Central Bank of Turkey adopted full-fledged inflation targeting at the 
beginning of 2006.  The regime brought many innovations in terms of decision-making 
process and the role of communication.  In terms of communication aspects, there were 
two main innovations: First, the CBT started to publish the medium term inflation 
forecasts along with some qualitative information regarding the future policy path.  
Second, the CBT enhanced the forward looking information content of the policy 
statements, providing more specific guidance regarding the revisions in the policy stance.  
In sum, the implementation of full-fledged inflation targeting, coupled with the new 
strategy adopted by the MPC, has increased the forward looking component of the 
monetary policy.   
With the adoption of full-fledged inflation targeting, monthly MPC statements 
became one of the main tools of monetary policy communication.
7 The MPC statement, 
                                                 
7 In addition to policy statements, there are other communication tools to inform the public.  Examples of 
such tools are the biannual testimony of the Governor before the Council of Ministers and the Planning and 
Budget Commission of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey; monthly “Price Developments” reports 
issued on the following working day of the release of inflation figures; biannual “Financial Stability 
Report”; press releases, presentations and speeches made by the Central Bank authorities in Turkey and 
abroad.  In addition, working papers, booklets, technical notes, conferences and workshops arranged by the 10 
 
published immediately after the decision, typically consists of two main paragraphs.  The 
first paragraph provides MPC’s assessment of economic conditions relevant for inflation 
outlook.  The second paragraph is the “policy paragraph”, which directly elaborates on 
the MPC’s view of the likely course of future interest rates.  We utilize the information 
content of both paragraphs while quantifying the monetary policy communication.   
 
Timing of the MPC Statements  
Since 2005, meetings are based on a pre-announced schedule with an annual 
timetable.  In 2005, the meetings were held on the 8
th of each month or the closest 
business day if the 8
th corresponded to a weekend.  The policy statements were published 
the next morning at 9:00 AM.  In 2006, MPC meetings were held at dates close to the end 
of month, whereas from 2007 to present the meetings are scheduled around mid-month.
8 
Since 2006, the interest rate decision and the related MPC statement is announced by the 
Central Bank in a press release at 7:00 PM on the same day and posted on the website of 
the Bank.  
 
 
3.  Measuring Communication 
Central bank communication is a broad concept.  Although there are many 
different reasons why central banks communicate with the public, central bank 
                                                                                                                                                 
Bank also work as different means of the communication policy.  However, these communication tools 
generally do not reveal extra information other than those disseminated through inflation reports and 
monthly policy statements.   
8 There were two inter-meetings of the MPC that took place in June 2006, following the financial turmoil 
triggered by a sell-off in emerging markets.   11 
 
communication efforts in general concentrate on two interrelated issues: (i) anchoring 
long term inflation expectations, (ii) increasing the effectiveness of the monetary policy.  
In this paper, we focus on the latter.  Effectiveness of the monetary policy depends on the 
control over the yield curve.  This basically boils down to communicating the future path 
of the policy rates, aiming to shape up the term structure of market interest rates in the 
desired direction.  In this context, this paper has two goals: First, we assess whether 
central bank communication affects the predictability of future policy rate decisions.  
Second, we investigate whether the communication has an impact on the yield curve, 
after controlling for the surprise component of the rate decision.  To tackle these 
ambitious tasks, we construct a database by quantifying both the information regarding 
the policy decisions implied in the CBT’s main published documents and the surprises in 
policy statements as perceived by the market participants.  We set up two different types 
of communication variables aiming to capture (i) the direction of the next interest rate 
decision, and (ii) surprise in communication.   
The documents we use to extract the forward looking signals regarding future 
monetary policy are the monthly statements accompanying interest rate decisions.  
Clearly, there are other forms of verbal or written communication tools available such as 
speeches/interviews by the governor or other members of the MPC.  Nevertheless, during 
the inflation targeting period, intermeeting speeches or interviews were not commonly 
used as active tools to manage the market’s expectations of future policy.  The monetary 
policy strategy of the Central Bank of Turkey was mainly communicated via monthly 
MPC statements and inflation reports.  This behavioral pattern mainly stems from MPC’s 
“collegial” structure: MPC members speak in harmony regarding monetary policy, and 12 
 
opposing views (if any) among the members are not disclosed.  When decisions are 
communicated as a consensus view, it is natural to disseminate the key messages 
regarding future interest rates through the main institutional documents such as inflation 
reports and monthly policy statements.  Therefore, the speeches and interviews by the 
MPC members (including the governor) during the intermeeting period do not typically 
reveal additional information other than those indicated in the official documents.
9 
Accordingly, we restrict our attention to the monthly MPC statements, which are the 
most tractable sources for quantifying the signal regarding the next interest rate decision 
along with the inflation reports.  We leave the task of measuring the communication 
impact of inflation reports for future studies.   
 
3.1.  Quantifying the Signal Regarding the Next Policy Decision  
One of the goals of this paper is to assess whether the CBT’s words match its 
deeds. In order to answer this question, we need to quantify the signal embedded in the 
policy statement regarding the next interest rate decision.  In this section, we describe the 
way we construct the variable indicating the bias regarding the next interest rate decision, 
namely, communication variable, 
COM
t D .  To this end, we classify all monthly MPC 
statements according to their implications for the likely path of interest rates over the near 
term.  We classify statements into those that indicate an inclination towards raising policy 
rates for the next meeting, those that suggest a rate cut and those that are neutral.  We 
also quantify the strength of the signal given by the MPC.  Therefore, the tightening and 
                                                 
9 There are some exceptional occasions when the Governor or the MPC members attempted to change the 
misunderstandings regarding the policy statements; however such cases are rare.   13 
 
the easing bias are further classified into two sub-categories as “weak” and “strong”.  
Next, all the classifications are coded on a numerical scale.   
We rely on the following principles in generating indicator variables for each 
statement:  
 (i) If a need for increasing (decreasing) the overnight inter-bank borrowing rate is 
expressed explicitly in the statement or if there are judgments about economic analysis 
end/or inflation prospects that clearly imply the need of a rate hike (cut) in the short term, 
then the variable is assigned the value 2 (-2),  
(ii) If a need for increasing (decreasing) the overnight inter-bank borrowing rate is 
expressed vaguely in the statement or if there are judgments about the economic analysis 
and/or inflation that weakly imply the need of a rate hike (cut) in the short term, then the 
variable is assigned the value 1 (-1), 
(iii) If the evaluations in the statement do not imply the need of a change in the 
policy rate over the near future, the variable is assigned the value zero.   
Accordingly, one of the five potential values is assigned for each written 














n inclinatio    easing   strong 2
n inclinatio     easing weak  1
change no   signaling 0
n inclinatio    ening weak tight 1
n inclinatio    g  tightenin strong     2
COM
t D  
The communication variable,
COM
t D , constructed in the above manner tracks 
changes in the statements regarding the future course of monetary policy.  Indeed, even 
small wording changes in the statement may suggest a change in the strength of the signal 14 
 
regarding the next policy decision.  To illustrate this case, consider the following 
examples.   
Example 1: On its February 2008 meeting, CBT cut interest rates by 25 basis 
points.  The following paragraph shows the relevant section of the accompanying policy 
statement regarding the next interest rate decision: 
“…  The timing of further easing will depend on developments regarding global 
market conditions, external demand, fiscal policy implementation, and other factors 
affecting the medium term inflation outlook.  (emphasis added)” 
The statement explicitly mentions a rate cut but emphasizes that the timing will 
depend on developments.  Therefore, we interpret this as a relatively weak signal of a 
further rate cut and set
COM
t D  =-1.
10 
Example 2: In the March 2009 meeting, the CBT cut the interest rates by 100 
basis points.  The following information was released with the policy statement: 
“…The Central Bank will continue to take the necessary measures to contain the 
adverse effects of the global financial turmoil on the domestic economy, provided that 
they do not conflict with the price stability objective.  Looking forward, the Committee 
envisages that the next rate cut may be measured, and that it may be necessary for the 
monetary policy to maintain an easing bias for a considerable period.  (emphasis added)” 
                                                 
10 A natural question one might ask at this point is how confident we are regarding the interpretation of 
these nuances in the policy statements.  We believe that our interpretation is very close to the true 
intentions of the policy makers because we discussed and checked the validity of our interpretation with the 
officials at the CBT.   15 
 
Here the MPC makes it clear that another rate cut is highly likely.  In this case, we 
set
COM
t D  =-2 to account for the stronger signal released by the CBT.  Table A1 in the 
appendix provides further examples from the policy statements regarding the preparation 
of 
COM
t D  while the third column in Table 1 shows the values attained by the 
COM
t D  
variable for the full sample.   
 
3. 3.  Surprise in Communication    
One of the main goals of this paper is to assess whether central bank 
communication has an impact on the term structure of interest rates.  The indicator 
variable constructed in the previous section does not help to answer this question, as we 
need to pin down the surprises in policy statements in order to identify the impact of the 
communication on asset prices.  Therefore, in this section, we construct a separate 
indicator variable to detect unanticipated changes in the policy statements by directly 
going through market commentaries associated with each policy statement.   
Revisions in the wording of policy statements are closely watched by market 
participants to extract the forward looking information regarding the policy path.  Market 
participants form their expectations about the content of these statements and adjust their 
positions accordingly.  As a result, if we want to measure the impact of policy statements 
on asset markets, we need to identify those cases where the changes in the policy 
statement were not anticipated by market participants.   
In order to identify whether the statement involves any surprise, we use the 
market commentaries that are regularly published before and after the statement/report is 
released.  To this end, we use the database of Reuters News, a newswire service that is 16 
 
frequently used by financial market participants.  We search this database for the market 
participants’ commentaries both before and after the policy decision.  Prior to the 
meeting, the market participants not only report their expectations on policy decisions but 
occasionally mention the messages they expect the CBT to deliver with respect to the 
future course of interest rates.  We check all market commentaries reported before the 
meeting to understand the expectations with respect to the statement.  Then, we compare 
these expectations with market commentaries reported after the policy decision.  We seek 
to detect surprises in communication perceived by the market participants, such as an 
unexpected change in the MPC’s assessment of the economic conditions or the monetary 
policy outlook.   
In general, market commentaries do not elaborate much on the expected policy 
statement before the meeting.  However, if the statement delivers an unexpected message, 
it is mentioned in the commentaries following the meeting.  It is also possible to identify 
the direction of the surprise (whether the statement was more “hawkish” or “dovish” than 
expected) directly from the market commentaries.  Although we are not able to measure 
the size of the market surprise, we nevertheless believe that this methodology of 
identifying the surprises is still innovative and useful.   
Accordingly, we rely on the following principles in generating the indicator 
variable to capture the surprise change in the policy statement ( t ST Surp∆ ):  
(i)  If comparison of the market reports/commentaries before and after the 
MPC meetings reveals that the statement was more hawkish (dovish) 
than market expectations, then the variable is assigned the value 1 (-1).   17 
 
(ii)  If the market reports/commentaries do not indicate a surprise in 








− expected n  dovish tha   more   was statement The 1
                                                  Surprise   No    0
expected an  hawkish th   more   was statement The 1
t ST Surp  
 
In order to illustrate our methodology, look at the market commentary following 
the policy statement in July 2007:  
“MPC’s action as to leave the interest rates unchanged as expected but the 
surprise announcement that gradual easing may start in the last quarter is 
expected to pull the market interest rates and the exchange rates down (emphasis 
added)” 
In our analysis, we interpret that the policy statement in July 2007 were perceived as 
more dovish than expected for market participants, and thus we set the surprise variable 
t ST Surp∆ = -1, although the policy decision itself (leaving rates constant) was completely 
expected.   
                                                 
11According to our methodology, if the market commentaries do not indicate any unanticipated policy 
move, we interpret this as “no surprise”.  This may be due to two reasons: (i) market participants correctly 
anticipated the changes in the wording of the statement (ii) market participants did not notice the 
implications of the changes in the wording of the statement.  Unfortunately, our methodology cannot 
differentiate between these cases.  On the other hand, market response would be identical in both scenarios 
on the day of the announcement because in both cases, market participants would not respond to the 
information released in the statements.  Therefore, even though our methodology is subject to limitations, 
these problems do not lead to any econometric problems.   18 
 
Surprises in the statements may arise due to various reasons such as disagreement 
between the CBT and the market’s views on the inflation outlook, unexpected changes in 
the CBT’s objectives, market’s misinterpretation of CBT’s signals and so on.  In this 
paper we do not distinguish between these cases.  We rather take an agnostic view and 
identify statement surprises directly from the market commentaries.  Based on this 
information, we are also able to ask the following question: Do the market players update 
their expectations when they are faced with a statement surprise? If the answer is a “yes”, 
this means the monetary authority has some leverage to shape up the yield curve towards 
its intended direction.  If the answer is a “no”, that would suggest the market largely 
ignores the signals given by the CBT.  Therefore, in our setup, by assessing the 
significance of the impact of statement surprises on financial markets, we also implicitly 
test the degree of central bank credibility.  Table A2 in the appendix illustrates the 
construction of ( t ST Surp∆ ) with a few examples based on market commentaries.  The 
sixth column in Table 1 shows the values of the t ST Surp∆  variable for the full sample.
12 
 
4.  Empirical Analysis 
This section evaluates the different aspects of monetary policy communication on 
financial markets.  In the first part, we investigate whether the CBT’s signal regarding the 
next interest rate decision (
COM
t D ) has improved the predictability of CBT.  In the second 
part, we assess the effects of central bank communication over the yield curve.   
 
                                                 
12Notice that this variable is only available after 2005 because market commentaries were not available on a 
regular basis before that date. 19 
 
4.1.  Changes in the Predictability of Central Bank 
Successful communication by the central bank is expected to improve the 
predictability of the central bank’s actions in the near future.  One way to test this is to 
check whether the signal that is released by the central bank regarding the future policy 
move (
COM
t D ) is helpful in predicting the size of the next policy move.
13 
Table 1 provides a quick look at the data.  The first column in this table shows the 
policy rate while the second column tracks those instances when the policy rate was 
changed.  The third and the fourth columns show 
COM
t D  and 
COM
t D 1 − respectively.
14 
Successful signaling by the CBT implies non-zero values in column 2 to be associated 
with non-zero values in column 4, and zeros in column 2 to be associated with zeros in 
column 4.  In table 1, those instances of accurate signaling are shaded.  Note that the 
frequency of the shaded rows increase substantially over time.  Indeed, in the period 
before 2005, there were 15 cases (white rows in Table 1) in which the policy action was 
not consistent with the signal released in the previous month.  This is a whopping 43 
percent of the observations for that period.  Meanwhile, there are only six incidences, or 9 
                                                 
13At this point we should remind the reader that the variable  COM
t D  is prepared by consulting with the 
officials at the CBT.  Hence, it is constructed so as to capture the true intentions of the central bank.  
Instead,  if  COM
t D  were prepared by a computer or a neutral third party, we would be testing whether an 
outsider’s interpretation of the next policy move is helpful in predicting the next move of the central bank 
(rather than the actual message sent by the central bank), which would be a different question to answer.   
14 Table 1 is constructed at the monthly frequency.  In the period before 2005, MPC meeting schedules 
were not public knowledge and only policy rate changes were announced publicly.  In those months when 
there were no policy announcements, 
COM
t D is set equal to zero.   20 
 
percent of observations, in which the policy change was inconsistent with the previous 
signal in the period after 2005.   
While a close correspondence between 
COM
t D 1 − and the current policy action points 
to successful communication by the central bank, the reverse is not necessarily true.  This 
is because lack of a correspondence between 
COM
t D 1 − and the current policy action may 
arise from a quick reversal of market developments that force the central bank to change 
its intentions since the last policy meeting.  The policy easing that came in response to 
the financial turmoil in September 2007 is a good example of this situation.  During its 
policy meeting in August 2007, the CBT signaled that policy rates would stay constant in 
September, and hence 
COM
t D was set equal to zero in that month.  The outbreak of the 
crisis in the US mortgage market in August 2007 led the CBT to update the external 
outlook on the downside and initiate an earlier-than expected easing cycle in September 
2007.   
Whether the signals provided by the CBT improves the predictability of the policy 
decisions can be tested formally by measuring the informative capacity of 
COM
t D 1 − in 
predicting the CBT’s next policy decision.  The forecasting model developed by 
Hamilton and Jorda (2002), the Autoregressive Conditional Hazard (ACH) model, is a 
very suitable tool for this purpose.  In the next sub-section we briefly describe the ACH 
model.  Readers who are familiar with (or not interested in) the technical aspects of this 
model can move on to the following sub-section where we interpret our results derived 




The Autoregressive Conditional Hazard Model 
The time series of policy rate changes has unusual statistical properties and are 
typically referred to as a marked point processes in the statistics literature.  One of these 
properties is that the policy rate is changed irregularly in time.  That is, we are uncertain 
about when the policy rate will be changed next, given information available today.  The 
process describing when events take place in time is called a point process.  The value 
that the point process takes at each event time is called the mark.  For the purposes of this 
paper, we are only interested in the points and not the marks.  This is because the 
variable, 
COM
t D , only provides information about the direction of the next policy move 
without its size.   
In particular, let xt= 0 if there is no change in the policy rate after the policy 
meeting in month t, and xt= 1 if there is a change—thus, xt describes the process for the 
points (Column 2 in Table 1).  Let zt denote a vector of exogenous variables that capture 
the information that were released at the last policy meeting, which is
COM
t D 1 − in our 
exercise.  Let  t Ω  denote the information set in month t.  Our task is to model the 
probability distribution of xt conditional on the past.   
  The ACH model seeks an answer to the following question: What is the 
probability that during the next policy meeting, the policy rate will be changed, 
conditional on information available today? Denote this probability by ht, typically 
referred to as the hazard in the duration literature.  Then,  1 (1 |) ttt hP x − = =Ω .  In 
addition, we define the following auxiliary variables.  Let  1 {} t ω ,  1,2,..., tT =  be a 22 
 
sequence that, for any date t records the date of the most recent change in the policy rate 
as of time t, 
11 , 1 (1 ) for 1,2,..., tt t t tx x t T ω ω − =+ − =  
so that  1t t ω =  if the policy rate changes on month t and  1τ ω stays at t for subsequent 
monthsτ until a new rate change.  In general, let  jt ω  be the date of the 
th j  most recent 
policy rate change as of date t: 
1 , 1 , 1 ) 1 ( − − − − + = t j t t j t jt x x ω ω ω for ... , 3 , 2 = j   and   T t ..., , 2 , 1 =  
Using this notation,  1, 1 2, 1 tt ω ω −− −  corresponds to the length of the duration between 
the most recent two policy rate changes as of date  1 t −  (Column 5 in Table 1).  In 
general, the duration between the
th j and the (1 )
th j+  most recent policy rate changes is 
,1 ,1 1 ,1 jt jt j t u ω ω −− + − =− .   
  Going back to the hazard rate, note that if the only information contained in  1 t− Ω  
were the dates of previous policy rate changes, the hazard rate  t h  would not change until 
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It is natural to generalize expression (1) by allowing  t ψ  to have a traditional linear 
time series representation for the conditional first moment and to incorporate the effects 
of exogenous variables, linearly.  In an expression similar to that adopted in Hamilton 
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                                                                 (2) 
where the denominator is appropriately constrained to ensure that it is positive and 
[0,1] t h ∈ .   
 The  likelihood  associated  with expression (2) is simply 
       ∑     log        1     log  1         
                                                             (3) 
which can be maximized numerically with respect to the vector of population parameters 
by standard procedures.   
 
The Estimation Results from the ACH Model 
The ACH model is estimated for our sample period that spans from February 
2002 through July 2010.
15 Table 2 reports the maximum likelihood estimates of the final 
ACH model for the full sample (column 1) as well as the period before 2005 (column 2).  
The estimates suggest somewhat persistent serial correlation in the hazard for the pre-
2005 sample, with β θ + = 0.34, which disappears for the full sample, with β θ + =0.13.   
Our primary goal in estimating the ACH model is to check the predictive ability 
of the communication variable, 
COM
t D 1 − .  In order to test whether there is any asymmetry 
between the easing and the tightening signals, we decompose this variable into 
COM
t D 1 −
(Positive), 
COM
t D 1 − (Negative), and 
COM
t D 1 − (Neutral).  Accordingly, 
COM
t D 1 − (Positive) reflects 
                                                 
15 We exclude June 2006 from the analysis.  During this month there were two intermeeting changes one 
before and one after the regularly scheduled policy meeting.   24 
 
the value of 
COM
t D 1 − when it is positive.  That is, this variable captures those instances 
when the CBT signaled a tightening for the next month, and is 0 otherwise.  The negative 
and significant coefficient associated with this variable indicates that the probability of a 
policy change rises significantly when the CBT sends a stronger tightening signal, an 
expected result.
16 The variable 
COM
t D 1 − (Negative) tracks the values of 
COM
t D 1 − when the 
CBT sends an easing signal.  Hence, the values of this variable range between -2, -1, and 
0, with -2 reflecting the strongest easing signal and 0 reflecting a neutral signal.  The 
coefficient associated with 
COM
t D 1 − (Negative) is positive and significant.  Increases in this 
variable, which indicate weaker signals towards an easing and stronger signals towards 
no change, decrease the probability of an interest rate change.  In fact, the coefficient 
estimates associated with 
COM
t D 1 − (Positive) and 
COM
t D 1 − (Negative) are almost the mirror 
images of each other and the difference between them is not statistically significant.  This 
result suggests that there is no asymmetry regarding the signals sent before policy easings 
or tightenings.  Finally, the indicator variable 
COM
t D 1 − (Neutral) takes the value of 1 when 
the CBT sends a neutral signal (i.e.  
COM
t D 1 − =0) and 0 otherwise.  The positive and 
significant coefficient associated with this variable indicates that a neutral signal 
decreases the chances of a rate change, consistent with the nature of the message.  These 
results are very intuitive and suggest that the CBT sends the right messages to prepare the 
markets about its next policy action.  Meanwhile, the second column shows the estimates 
                                                 
16 Recall from equation (2) that the vector of explanatory variables, zt,, is inversely related to the hazard 
rate.  Hence, a “negative” coefficient estimate in Table 2 indicates that the particular variable in question 
lowers the denominator and hence “increases” the hazard rate.  25 
 
of the model for the period before 2005.  None of the components of 
COM
t D 1 − are 
significant for this sample.
17 This is consistent with the institutional setup of monetary 
policy during the post-2005 period, where the CBT made no explicit effort to signal its 
next interest rate move through policy statements (see section 2.1).   
  In addition to model fit, we also explored the model’s forecasting performance.  
The ACH produces forecasts of the probability that, conditional on information signaled 
by
COM
t D 1 − , the CBT will change the policy rate in the next month.  We termed this 
probability as the hazard and we denote its forecast by
^
t h .  On the basis of this probability 
forecast, one can construct the series of predicted changes, 
^
t x  by comparing 
^
t h  to the 
average hazard over the period, 
__
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The statistics literature provides two conventional measures to gauge the model’s 
performance: specificity and sensitivity.  Specificity measures the proportion of events 
(i.e.   1 t x = ) that were properly forecasted (
^
1 t x = ) while sensitivity measures the 
proportion of non-events ( 0 t x = ) properly forecasted (
^
0 t x = ).  As an illustration, had 
we chosen the forecast: “
^
1 t x =  for all t,” our specificity measure would have scored a 
perfect 100% while our sensitivity measure would have scored a disastrous 0%.  The 
                                                 
17Note that there are no tightening signals (or a rate hike) in the period before 2005 and hence
COM
t D 1 −
(Positive) is dropped from that sample.   26 
 
values attained by the ACH models are quite well balanced and strikingly high for the 
full sample (76% and 83% respectively).  The predictive power of the model is 
substantially lower for the pre-2005 sample with the specificity and the sensitivity 
measures of 42% and 50% respectively.  These results are highly consistent with the 
discussion in section 2.1 that prior to 2005 the timing of the policy decisions was not 
predictable and the statements did not provide systematic information on the future 
course of monetary policy.  Meanwhile, with the significant steps taken towards 
transparency after 2005, the CBT now provides a substantial amount of information 
regarding its next policy move.   
 
4.2.  The Yield Curve Response to Monetary Policy Surprises 
So far, we have shown that the CBT pursues a successful communication policy 
through its written statements in preparing the markets for its next policy decision.  In 
other words, the CBT guides the markets in the right direction.   
In this section, we go one step further and try to assess the impact of monetary 
policy on the term structure of interest rates.  Since financial markets respond only to 
unanticipated information released in policy statements, we measure the response of the 
yield curve to monetary policy surprises.  Monetary policy surprises can take place either 
by actions or words.  Therefore, we first evaluate the impact of the surprises in interest 
rate decisions (actions); next, we move to the main theme of the paper and evaluate the 




Surprises in Interest Rate Decisions  
Following Kuttner (2001), the responsiveness of financial markets to policy rate 
changes is typically tested through equation (4) where the change in the term rate is 
regressed on the expected and surprise components of a policy change: 
t t PR Surp PR Exp r ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ 2 1 β β α   (4)
where r ∆  is the change in the term rate,  t PR Exp∆ and  t PR Surp∆ are the expected and 
surprise components of the change in the policy rate.  In this paper, we calculate the 
anticipated and the unanticipated components of the policy rate based on (i) surveys or 
(ii) market based measures.  The market based measure of the unanticipated policy 
change is calculated as the daily change in one-month constant maturity series following 
Rigobon and Sack (2004).  Because of the short maturity of the underlying security, we 
do not expect the surprise component to reflect any information regarding the 
unanticipated component of the policy statement (which covers a longer time span).  For 
robustness purposes, Equation (4) is calculated using the expected and surprise series that 
are derived via both methodologies.   
We estimate equation (4) for six-month, one-year, two-year, and three-year 
government bond rates as well as the benchmark interest rate.
18 Tables 3a and 4a show 
the estimation results using survey based and market based measures of expectations 
respectively.  The results indicate that Turkish financial markets act consistently with the 
expectations hypothesis, as also shown by Aktaş et al.  (2008) and Demiralp and Yılmaz 
(2010).  Following a policy action, market participants only respond to the unanticipated 
                                                 
18 “Benchmark” interest rate is the interest rate of the most liquid government security in Turkey (typically 
with maturity between one and two years).   28 
 
portion of the policy change.  Overall, the estimates obtained from the two measures are 
pretty close to each other and close to those obtained for the US by Kuttner (2001).  
Unlike the US case, however, there is not a significant decline in the response 
coefficients when the maturity of the security lengthens.  Specifically, in response to a 
percentage point surprise change in the policy rate, the yield curve shifts about 50 basis 
points.   
 
Surprises in Communication 
The specification in equation (4) implicitly assumes that the only driving force 
behind interest rate movements following a policy action is unanticipated interest rate 
changes.  It overlooks any potential response to unanticipated changes in policy 
statements.  Meanwhile, it is not very difficult to think of examples where the market 
response was driven solely by surprise statements rather than the decision itself.  In our 
sample, we have several such cases: Figure 2 shows the changes in the yield curve on the 
days after the MPC meeting in April 2007, July 2007, April 2008, and September 2008.  
What is common for all these dates is that there was no interest rate change and this was 
perfectly anticipated by market participants.  Nevertheless, the CBT changed the 
monetary policy stance by changing the wording in all four cases, which took market 
participants by surprise.  In April 2007 and April 2008, the CBT adopted a tighter policy 
stance than expected.  As a result, the yield curve shifted up on these days.  In July 2007 
and September 2008, this time the CBT changed the wording of the statement by 
implying an easier stance than expected which led to a downward shift of the yield curve.  
These examples illustrate that even if there is no interest rate surprise, unanticipated 29 
 
changes in policy statements are very relevant in explaining changes in the yield curve.  
The rest of this section seeks to verify this observation through empirical analysis.  To 
this end, we augment equation (4) with statement surprises and estimate the following 
equation:
19 
t t t ST Surp PR Surp PR Exp r ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ 3 2 1 β β β α   (5)
where t ST Surp∆ refers to the surprise changes in policy communication as described in 
section 3.3.  To the extent that the information contained in interest rate changes are 
related to changes in policy statements, equation (5) provides a more comprehensive 
version of equation (4) and addresses any potential bias due to omitted variables.  If, on 
the other hand the information contained in interest rate changes are orthogonal to the 
forward looking information reflected in the statements, then tests of the sensitivity of the 
yield curve to monetary policy announcements via equation (4) following Kuttner (2001) 
should produce valid coefficient estimates even though equation (5) is a more 
comprehensive specification.
20 
Tables 3b and 4b show the estimation results from equation (5).  Note that the 
market response to policy statements is in line with expectations and highly significant 
for the unanticipated changes.  We observe that the yield curve shifts by up to an 
additional 20 basis points due to surprise changes in policy statements (row five).  The 
explanatory power of the regression increases significantly by five to ten percentage 
                                                 
19 The sample period starts in 2005 because market commentaries of policy statements are only available 
after this date.   
20The simple correlation coefficient between CBT
t PR Surp ∆ and  ST Surp∆ is 0.45 while the simple correlation 
coefficient between  Market
t PR Surp ∆  and ST Surp∆ is 0.30.   30 
 
points depending on the underlying measure of expectations as shown by the 
2
__
R  (row 
six).  Note that a direct comparison between the coefficient estimates associated with 
interest rate surprises and statement surprises cannot be made based on Tables 3 and 4 
because the units of measurement for the two variables are substantially different.  
Indeed, while the interest rate surprise variable, 
CBT
t PR Surp∆ , ranges between -240 and 
+20, statement surprise variable,  ST Surp∆ , ranges between -1 and +1 by construction.  In 
order to provide a comparison of the order of magnitude effect between the two kinds 
surprises, we normalized both series and re-ran equation (5).  We found that the 
coefficient estimates associated with interest rate and statement surprises were 
insignificantly different from each other for each maturity (not shown).  This result is in 
line with Rosa (2011) who found that the impact of interest rate and statement surprises 
had comparable effects on the US dollar exchange rate. 
Our findings are consistent with the earlier literature in the sense that the impact 
of the signals regarding the future stance of monetary policy tends to increase with the 
maturity of the contract (see Andersson et al.  2006, Kuttner, 2001, Demiralp and Jorda, 
2004, Kohn and Sack, 2004).  Indeed, the coefficients associated with surprise statements 
are significantly different between six-month and three-year maturity contracts for both 
expectations measures.   
Next, we investigate how the responsiveness of the yield curve to unanticipated 
policy statements changes over time.  To that end, we consider a 25-observation rolling 
windows analysis of equation (5).  Figure 3 shows the results from this exercise.  The 
upper panel of the figure plots the coefficients associated with unanticipated interest rate 
surprises ( 2 β ) while the lower panel plots the coefficients associated with unanticipated 31 
 
statements ( 3 β ) that are significant at 95 percent level of confidence.  The first estimation 
period ends in November 2006, which is the starting point in the graph.  Figure 3 
illustrates that the responsiveness to interest rate surprises declines through time, while 
the responsiveness of the yield curve to policy statements have increased over time.  This 
type of a “substitution effect” may reflect that with the improvements in the information 
content of the CBT’s statements, market participants started placing more emphasis on 
policy statements at the expense of interest rate surprises given that policy statements 
provide more forward looking information that are relevant for longer term securities.   
Moreover, we note that longer-term securities are more responsive to the message 
released in policy statements relative to shorter-term securities.  This finding is intuitive 
because the information regarding the monetary policy stance is more likely to be 
influential over a longer horizon.  Furthermore, the sensitivity of the different maturities 
to policy statements also increases over time.  That is, the wedge between the 
responsiveness of the shortest maturity asset (6-month) and the longest maturity asset (3-
year) widens over time.  The visible jump in the responsiveness to statement surprises 
around 2008 is related to the overall elevation of uncertainty during the financial crisis 
and a series of well-pronounced policy surprises in this period.  Because of the long 
lasting nature of the crisis, longer-term assets are affected more from these crisis-related 
surprises relative to shorter-term assets.   
 
5.  Conclusions 
Over the last decade, policy statements that accompany interest rate decisions 
became an indispensible policy tool across the world.  However, measuring the effects of 32 
 
policy statements on financial markets is challenging due to the difficulties involved in 
quantifying these statements and assessing the unanticipated component of these 
statements.  In this paper, we follow a narrative approach to quantify the policy 
statements released by the CBT to evaluate the predictive power of these statements in 
forecasting the next interest rate decision.  Our results suggest that policy statements 
became extremely helpful in predicting the direction of the next interest rate decision in 
the period after 2005.  In a second contribution, we introduce a new way to measure the 
surprise component associated with policy statements.  We identify the surprises in 
policy communication by using market commentaries/reports associated with monthly 
policy statements.  Our results indicate that financial market participants in Turkey 
respond to the surprises in policy statements in a prompt manner, especially after the 
adoption of the inflation targeting regime.  We also compare the impact of the surprise 
component of policy decisions (actions) with the surprises in policy communication 
(words) on the term structure of interest rates.  Our results suggest that the relative 
influence of communication over the yield curve has increased through time.  These 
findings lend support to the view that communication through written statements 
accompanying the interest rate decision is a key instrument of monetary policy especially 
under an inflation targeting regime.   
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Table 1: Policy Rate and the Communication Signals 
 
  Policy Rate  Event 
COM
t D  
COM
t D 1 −   Duration  t ST Surp∆  
Feb-02  57  1  -2    -- 
Mar-02 54  1  -2  -2  1  -- 
Apr-02  48  1  -2  -2  1  -- 
May-02 48  0  0  -2  1  -- 
June-02  48  0  0  0  1  -- 
July-02  48  0  0  0  1  -- 
Aug-02  46  1  -2 0 4 -- 
Sept-02 46  0  0  -2  4  -- 
Oct-02  46  0  0  0  4  -- 
Nov-02  44  1  -1 0 3 -- 
Dec-02 44  0  0  -1  3  -- 
Jan-03  44  0  0  0  3  -- 
Feb-03  44  0  0  0  3  -- 
Mar-03  44  0  0  0  3  -- 
Apr-03  41  1  -1 0 5 -- 
May-03 41  0  0  -1  5  -- 
June-03  38  1  -1 0 2 -- 
July-03  35  1  -2  -1  1  -- 
Aug-03  32  1  -2  -2  1  -- 
Sept-03  29  1  -2  -2  1  -- 
Oct-03  26  1  -1  -2  1  -- 
Nov-03 26  0  0  -1  1  -- 
Dec-03  26  0  0  0  1  -- 
Jan-04  26  0  0  0  1  -- 
Feb-04  24  1  -2 0 4 -- 
Mar-04  22  1  -1  -2  1  -- 
Apr-04 22  0  0  -1  1  -- 
May-04  22  0  0  0  1  -- 
June-04  22  0  0  0  1  -- 
July-04  22  0  0  0  1  -- 
Aug-04  22  0  0  0  1  -- 
Sept-04  20  1 0 0 6 -- 
Oct-04  20  0  0  0  6  -- 
Nov-04  20  0  0  0  6  -- 
Dec-04  18  1  -2 0 3 -- 
Jan-05  17  1  -1  -2  1  -1 
Feb-05  16.5  1  -2  -1  1  0 
Mar-05  15.5  1  -2  -2  1  0 
Apr-05  15  1  -1  -2  1  1 
May-05  14.5  1  -1  -1  1  0 
June-05  14.25  1  -1  -1  1  0 
July-05  14.25  0  0  -1  1  0 
Aug-05  14.25  0  0  0  1  0 
Sept-05  14.25  0  -1  0  1  0 
Oct-05  14  1  -1  -1  4  0 
Nov-05  13.75  1  -1  -1  1  0 
Dec-05  13.5  1  0  -1  1  1 
Jan-06  13.5  0  0  0  1  0 
Feb-06  13.5  0  0  0  1  0 36 
 
Mar-06  13.5  0  -1  0  1  0 
Apr-06  13.25  1  0  -1  4  0 
May-06  13.25  0  0  0  4  0 
June-06  15  0  1  0  4  0 
July-06  17.5  1  0  1  3  0 
Aug-06  17.5  0  0  0  3  0 
Sept-06  17.5  0  0  0  3  0 
Oct-06  17.5  0  0  0  3  0 
Nov-06  17.5  0  0  0  3  0 
Dec-06  17.5  0  0  0  3  0 
Jan-07  17.5  0  0  0  3  0 
Feb-07  17.5  0  0  0  3  0 
Mar-07  17.5  0  0  0  3  0 
Apr-07  17.5  0  0  0  3  1 
May-07  17.5  0  0  0  3  0 
June-07  17.5  0  0  0  3  0 
July-07  17.5  0  0  0  3  -1 
Aug-07  17.5  0  0  0  3  0 
Sept-07 17.25 1 -2  0 14 -1 
Oct-07  16.75  1  -2  -2  1  0 
Nov-07  16.25  1  -2  -2  1  0 
Dec-07  15.75  1  -2  -2  1  0 
Jan-08  15.50  1  -2  -2  1  0 
Feb-08  15.25  1  -1  -2  1  0 
Mar-08  15.25  0 0  -1 1 0 
Apr-08  15.25  0  1  0  1  1 
May-08  15.75  1  2  1  3  0 
June-08  16.25  1  2  2  1  0 
July-08  16.75  1  1  2  1  0 
Aug-08  16.75  0 0 1 1 0 
Sept-08  16.75  0  0  0  1  -1 
Oct-08  16.75  0  0  0  1  0 
Nov-08  16.25  1 0 0 4  -1 
Dec-08  15  1  -2 0 1  -1 
Jan-09  13  1  -2  -2  1  -1 
Feb-09  11.5  1  -2  -2  1  -1 
Mar-09  10.5  1  -2  -2  1  0 
Apr-09  9.75  1  -2  -2  1  0 
May-09  9.25  1  -2  -2  1  0 
June-09  8.75  1  -2  -2  1  -1 
July-09  8.25  1  -2  -2  1  -1 
Aug-09  7.75  1  -2  -2  1  -1 
Sept-09  7.25  1  -2  -2  1  -1 
Oct-09  6.75  1  -2  -2  1  0 
Nov-09  6.50  1  0  -2  1  0 
Dec-09  6.50  0  0  0  1  0 
Jan-10  6.50  0  0  0  1  0 
Feb-10  6.50  0  0  0  1  0 
Mar-10  6.50  0  0  0  1  1 
Apr-10  6.50  0  0  0  1  -1 
May-10  6.50  0  0  0  1  0 
June-10  6.50  0  0  0  1  -1 




 Estimates for the ACH model 
 
Dependent Variable: Indicator Variable of Changes in the Policy Rate 
 
 Variable Full Sample  Pre-2005 
1. Constant  1.18 6.70
   (1.74) (0.76)
2.  COM
t D 1 − (Positive)  -0.79** --
   
(-2.11) --
3.  COM
t D 1 − (Negative)  0.65* 3.52
   (1.92) (0.80)
4.  COM
t D 1 − (Neutral)  3.15* -5.18
   (1.83) (-0.59)
5.   Number of Observations  98 33
6.   Mean Log-Likelihood   -42.85 -18.91
7.   Persistence (=θ  +β )  0.13 0.34
8.  Specificity  0.76 0.42
9.   Sensitivity  0.83 0.50
t-statistics in parenthesis.**/* indicates significance at 95/90 level of confidence. 



















Table 3a: The Yield Curve Response to Interest Rate Changes (Using Survey-Based 
Measures of Expectations) 
Sample Period: 1/11/2005-7/16/2010 
 
   I.
m
t r
6 ∆  II.
yr
t r
1 ∆  III.
yr
t r
2 ∆  IV.
yr
t r
3 ∆  
1. Constant  0.53 0.39 0.85 -1.64
   (0.23)  (0.13) (0.24) (-0.47)
2. 
CBRT
t PR Exp∆   -0.05 -0.12 -0.17 -0.20
   (-0.69) (-1.24) (-1.48) (-1.65)
3. 
CBRT
t PR Surp ∆   0.54** 0.46** 0.49** 0.46**




0.41 0.21 0.17 0.14
t-statistics in parenthesis.  **/* indicates significance at 95/90 level of confidence. 
 
Table 3b: The Yield Curve Response to Policy Changes (Using Survey-Based 
Measures of Expectations) 
 
Sample Period: 1/11/2005-7/16/2010 
   I.
m
t r
6 ∆  II.
yr
t r
1 ∆  III.
yr
t r
2 ∆  IV.
yr
t r
3 ∆  
1. Constant  1.05 1.07 1.56 -0.88
   (0.47)  (0.37) (0.47) (-0.28)
2. 
CBRT
t PR Exp∆   -0.06 -0.13 -0.18 -0.21
   (-0.79) (-1.39) (-1.51) (-1.64)
3. 
CBRT
t PR Surp ∆   0.45** 0.35** 0.38** 0.33**
   (5.11)  (3.06) (4.36) (2.68)
4.  t ST Surp∆   11.78** 15.34** 15.92** 17.39**




0.47 0.30 0.25 0.24















Table 4a: The Yield Curve Response to Interest Rate Changes (Using Market-Based 
Measures of Expectations) 
 
 
Sample Period: 1/11/2005-7/16/2010 
 
   I.
m
t r
6 ∆  II.
yr
t r
1 ∆  III.
yr
t r
2 ∆  IV.
yr
t r
3 ∆  
1. Constant  1.98 1.90 2.55 0.03
   (0.88)  (0.69) (0.83) (0.01)
2. 
Market
t PR Exp∆   0.18** 0.06 0.05 0.03
   (2.63)  (0.96) (0.61) (0.46)
3. 
Market
t PR Surp ∆   0.56** 0.60** 0.62** 0.56**




0.46 0.39 0.32 0.26




Table 4b: The Yield Curve Response to Policy Changes (Using Market-Based 
Measures of Expectations) 
 
 
Sample Period: 1/11/2005-7/16/2010 
 
   I.
m
t r
6 ∆  II.
yr
t r
1 ∆  III.
yr
t r
2 ∆  IV.
yr
t r
3 ∆  
1. Constant  2.33 2.32 2.99 0.52
   (1.09)  (0.89) (1.06) (0.18)
2. 
Market
t PR Exp∆   0.13** 0.01 0.00 -0.03
   (2.28)  (0.18) (-0.01) (-0.43)
3. 
Market
t PR Surp ∆   0.49** 0.51** 0.53** 0.45**
   (5.94)  (4.60) (4.13) (5.51)
4.  t ST Surp∆   11.82** 14.39** 15.08** 16.78**




0.53 0.47 0.39 0.35





















 Unanticipated Component of Policy Rate Changes 
 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Figure 3 
The Yield Curve Response to Policy Surprises 



































































































































































































































































































Appendix 1:  
 
Table A1: Examples of Policy Statements and their Coding with respect to the Next 
Policy Decision (
COM
t D ) 
 
Date Statement COM
t D  
June 2008  The Central Bank will consider a further measured rate hike when 
needed, so as to prevent the potential second-round effects of such 
risk factors.  The extent and timing of a possible future rate 
hike will depend on developments in global markets, external 
demand, fiscal policy implementation, and other factors affecting 
the medium term inflation outlook.   
+2 
July 2008  The Central Bank will consider a further measured rate hike when 
needed, so as to prevent the potential second-round effects of such 
risk factors.  The timing of a possible future rate hike will 
depend on developments in global markets, external demand, 
fiscal policy implementation, and other factors affecting the 




The Central Bank will continue to take the necessary measures to 
contain the adverse effects of the global financial turmoil on the 
domestic economy, provided that they do not conflict with the 
price stability objective.  Looking forward, the Committee 
envisages that the next rate cut may be measured, and that it 
may be necessary for the monetary policy to maintain an easing 




Accordingly, the Committee will closely monitor the lagged 
impacts of the recent rate cuts.  Besides, the second round effects 
on the wage and price setting behavior of elevated food and 
energy prices and of the developments in incomes policy will be 
watched closely.  The timing of further easing will depend on 
developments regarding global market conditions, external 
demand, fiscal policy implementation, and other factors affecting 




It should be underlined here that the cautious stance of monetary 
policy should be maintained in order to achieve the inflation 
target.  In the light of currently available data, the short-term 
interest rates are less likely to move upward than to move 
downward or to remain stable in the medium term.  However 
in the short term, the likelihood of the short-term interest 
rates to remain stable is gradually increasing compared to 
previous periods.  It is not possible to make a clear-cut statement 






Table A2: Examples of Market Commentaries and the Construction of 
S




t D    
Market Commentary 
April 2007  1 
“The MPC did not change the policy rate as expected but 
gave a stronger signal with respect to maintaining a tight 
monetary policy.  According to the market participants this 
signal weakened the expectations of policy rate cuts for early 
mid-2007.  ” 
July 2007  -1 
“ The Central Bank did not change the policy rate as 
expected but the surprise signal that the measured easing 
might start in the last quarter is expected to put downward 
pressure on exchange and interest rates.” 
April 2008  1 
“The central bank did not change the interest rates as 
expected.  Nevertheless the message in the policy 
statement was more hawkish than expected.  It is 
mentioned that a measured tightening may be considered 
when needed so this message heightened the expectations 
that the interest rates may rise in May.  ” 
Nov.  2008  -1 
“The policy decision is unexpected and surprising.  Besides, 
the explanation that there is a significant slowdown in 
domestic economic activity is also surprising.  ”  
Aug.  2009  -1 
“In a more dovish change to the statement, MPC notes that 
recent developments heightened uncertainties regarding the 
strength of recovery in consumption demand.  Following 
yesterday’s decision, we continue to expect another 50 bps 
cut in September.  However, tone of the rate statement is a 
touch more dovish, which strengthens the downside risks to 
our forecast for terminal policy rate at 7.25%.  ” 
 